Most notably, Reuters reported Friday that Fisker founder and former CEO Henrik Fisker has teamed up with Hong Kong mogul Richard Li in an effort to buy Fisker’s remaining $171 million in loans from the Department of Energy, so that Fisker won’t have to go bankrupt. The duo are offering between $25 million and $30 million for the loan, which would represent a discount of 17.5 cents on the dollar.

That isn’t the only low-priced bid for Fisker. A competing bid is a pre-packaged bankruptcy deal of $20 million from Chinese auto giant Wanxiang and Bob Lutz’s VL Automotive.

The other new project comes from Fisker’s former CEO Tom LaSorda, who only led Fisker for about 6 months. LaSorda has teamed up with racing investor Roger Penske to create a VC fund called IncWell, according to Bloomberg Business Week.

LaSorda told the publication that they probably wouldn’t invest in electric cars unless “unless I can get a good deal with Tesla,” and also said that they would not invest in another company founded by Henrik Fisker. LaSorda put his own money into Fisker.

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If Fisker is bought for $20 million that would mean the company would be bought for less than 1 percent of its reported $2.2 billion valuation when it launched the Karma in the late summer of 2011. Twenty million dollars is not quite two percent of the total funding ($1.2 billion) that Fisker raised. Fisker also owes the U.S. government another $171 million to pay back its loan. That’s got to be one of the biggest losses in venture capital history.

Row of Fisker Karmas

Earlier this year there were media reports that Fisker was being bids for between $200 million to $350 million from different Chinese auto companies. But either those reports put the bidding high (if so, I would speculate they were leaked by Fisker to help with bidding), something changed in the valuation of Fisker (it plummeted), or the bidders realized a lower valuation of Fisker after looking under the hood.

In a similar end game, solar thin film company Miasole was sold for $30 million to Chinese renewable power company Hanergy, after raising at least $500 million in venture capital funding. Both Miasole and Fisker were backed by Valley firm Kleiner Perkins.

Fisker’s potential bidders include VL Automotive, which is a joint venture between Lutz and Gilbert Villarreal. VL Automotive wants to turn the Fisker Karma into an internal combustion engine car, stripping out the electric drivetrain and giving it an engine.

Read my long investigative story on Fisker: A look under the hood: why electric car startup Fisker crashed and burned.

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The factory will be the first in the world building EcoMotor’s “opoc,” opposed piston, opposed cylinder engine, at a commercial scale. When it starts production in 2014, the factory will aim to produce 150,000 engines per year. There’s also an adjacent site that could expand production to 400,000 engines per year down the road.

Strategic deals with huge Chinese companies are becoming a valuable way for Valley cleantech startups to move into commercial production and actually have a chance at succeeding. In particular Khosla Ventures has been adept as of late at helping its companies navigate deals in China.

Chinese parts company Wanxiang invested $420 million into GreatPoint Energy – a company based in Cambridge, Mass. that converts coal into cleaner-burning natural gas — in order to commercialize GreatPoint’s technology in China. LanzaTech, which turns gases emitted from industrial processes into biofuels and biochemicals, is working with China’s largest steel producer, Baosteel, as well as Chinese coal producer Yankuang Group. Khosla Ventures has invested in both of these firms.

By partnering with a giant like Zhongding, EcoMotors doesn’t have to raise and spend a lot of money on infrastructure. In return, Zhongding will sell the engines domestically in China — these particular engines will be powerful ones used for generators, off-road vehicles and commercial vehicles. Chung called the strategy “cleantech done right.”

EcoMotors’ engine can be 20 to 50 percent more efficient, 20 to 25 percent lower in cost to buy, and half the size and half the weight of a traditional engine. For car manufacturers the capital savings are even greater — at 30 to 40 percent — when using EcoMotors engine to build an efficient vehicle. When placed in a passenger light weight vehicle, the engine could deliver a 100 MPG, 5-passener, car.

The Chinese car market, as well as the engine market, are the largest and fastest growing in the world. And the Chinese government has set very aggressive goals to reduce the country’s air pollution and carbon emissions.

EcoMotors is a particularly unusual investment for a venture capital firm because the internal combustion hasn’t seen much innovation in decades. But the global trends of needing this innovation are clear: more and more countries are pushing for lowered car emissions, air pollution is a massive problem throughout developing countries, and the cars that will catch on in the price conscious developing markets will be cars that use fuel efficiently and thus save their customers money. Other startups working on efficient engines include Pinnacle Engines, Achates Power, Grail Engine Technologies, and Transonic Combustion.

Updated at 3:00PM PST, April 9, with mention of the deal with Baosteel, China’s largest steel producer.

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Much has changed since then. With 2012 numbers done and dusted, I figure it’s time to revisit this topic – again, under the light of data. I’ll frame this analysis with the questions I’ve gotten from VCs and entrepreneurs who’ve asked me for an update.

What’s happening to cleantech venture capital?

It’s receding.

• Investment fell 30% in 2012 – and even further at the early stage. The Moneytree survey numbers had cleantech VC investment falling from $4.6 billion in 2011 to $3.3 billion in 2012 – a 28% drop. Further, they showed first-time funding of new start-ups plummeting 58% to just $216 million, and shrinking as the year progressed: By Q4, first-time funding was just 4% of capital invested.
• Limited partners are backing off. VC firms get the money they invest from limited partners (LPs) like foundations and pension funds. Last December Preqin called up 31 LPs that were invested in at least one cleantech-focused fund and asked if they planned to back any new ones in 2013. Only 22% said yes (down from 31% a year before).
• The people are changing. Many VC firms parted ways with their cleantech teams in 2012. While February’s ARPA-E conference had a record number of attendees, venture investors were scarce – replaced by a bumper crop of corporate types.

Why is this happening?

Cleantech VC performance is substantially lagging venture capital as a whole. This wasn’t true in 2011, but things changed fast in 2012.

I arrive at this conclusion by comparing two data sets. On one hand, we have data on the interim performance of 19 cleantech-only VC funds as reported by the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), a big LP. On the other, we have equivalent data for the entire universe of VC funds from the National Venture Capital Association. (The data are expressed as “value to paid-in capital, net to LPs,” which means “the current value of the funds divided by the money put into them, accounting for what VCs pay themselves.”) By comparing cleantech-only fund performance with the full VC universe at the same points in time, we can see whether cleantech is doing better or worse than the asset class.

The answer is that cleantech went sideways in 2012 while VC overall did well. In September 2010, the cleantech VC funds were worth 0.90x the money paid into them while comparable VC funds overall were at 0.96x – roughly the same. Six months later the gap had widened, but both had risen in value and remained within spitting distance. By June of 2012, however (the most recent data available), the cleantech funds had declined slightly while the overall VC universe climbed to 1.23x.

This is why investment is stalling, LPs are hesitating, and cleantech VCs are thinning: Capital invested in other domains is showing a greater near-term return.

If minimal money had gone into cleantech, or if the macro environment were rosier, there might be more willingness to forge ahead. But today, fund managers assess the $25 billion worth of cleantech VC invested since 2003 against a backdrop of shale gas and climate apathy – and tighten the purse strings.

OK, but why is that happening? What’s driving weak cleantech VC performance?

Two factors. First, there have been too few exits.

Let’s consider the gold standard of VC wins – an IPO on a major exchange. When I last did this analysis, cleantech was overperforming on the IPO front: In 2009, 2010, and 2011, cleantech’s share of VC-backed IPOs exceeded its share of VC funding. (Note: One must apply an appropriate time lag applied to the latter – I used five years, which is informed by deal-by-deal fundraising data by cleantech start-ups).

This ended in 2012. Just as in the prior year, three cleantech IPOs took place out of about 50 VC-backed IPOs in total (6%). But cleantech’s corresponding share of VC funding rose to 10% – so cleantech was now underperforming on exits relative to capital invested, instead of overperforming.

(Of course, most VC-backed companies exit through acquisition, not an IPO. But the M&A front looks no better for cleantech. When merchant bank Jane Capital counted up every acquisition of a VC-backed cleantech start-up worth more than $50 million in the last 10 years, it found just 27 of them.)

Second, the winners have disappointed post-IPO. When a start-up goes public, its VC investors rarely get to sell their shares immediately: They have to wait out a lockup period that typically lasts six months. Of the nine VC-backed cleantech start-ups that have done major-market IPOs since 2010 and have been public for more than six months, eight were trading below their IPO price at the 180-day mark.

In four of those cases, the 180-day share price was also lower than the price at the last venture round. That means VCs who bought shares in that round were under water when the lockup expired.

So is the pullback in cleantech VC justified?

Well, it’s certainly expected. The cleantech gold rush of the late 2000s saw hundreds of start-ups funded – many with identical propositions – that greatly exceeded the carrying capacity of their industries: For example, there’s no way that more than a handful of the 219 solar start-ups counted by Greentech Media in 2009 could possibly succeed. This dynamic isn’t unique to cleantech. The Internet VC bubble of the late 90s was the same story, albeit on a much larger scale.

But just as the boom-and-bust in dot com investment didn’t mean this whole Internet thing was a waste, the same is true for energy and environmental technologies. It’s very likely that multiple billion-dollar companies lurk among today’s cleantech VC portfolios. The question is – given the current retrenchment of capital from the field – how many of them will get the fuel to reach the finish line.

In the main, energy and environmental start-ups need outsized time, money, and risk tolerance to reach a big outcome. (That’s not true of IT-meets-energy “cleanweb” companies like Opower or Venrock-backed Nest Labs, but it holds for the deep-tech start-ups that comprise most of the category.) As our case study, let’s take First Solar, the pioneering thin-film solar maker. The company’s first instantiation was founded in 1990; it took 12 years to ship a product, was restarted in 1999, and consumed $150 million of equity investment (all Walton family money) before its 2007 IPO. But at that outcome, First Solar was worth $1.4 billion valuing the Walton stake at 8.4x. Two years later at the peak of the solar boom, it was worth 199x!

If this is what success looks like – that is, if the majority of cleantech start-ups will need more time and money to reach big outcomes compared with VC-backed companies overall – a few conclusions follow:

• Funds focused solely on cleantech will have a longer and deeper “J-curve” of returns compared with VC as a whole. When they reach the same final return multiple, they will take longer to do so (impacting IRR). Midway through the journey, their performance will look like an “L-curve.”
• To the extent that cleantech start-ups’ time to exit will be 10 years or more, it’s too early to call success or failure on the current crop – because most of them were founded in 2007 or later. Check back in five years.
• Because the time frames to an outcome are longer and the amounts of capital required are greater, cleantech investment should be less spikey compared with investment in, say, Internet start-ups. And lo and behold, that’s pretty much what we see:

Cleantech VC now is like Internet VC in 2001: on the downward slope of a bubble, albeit with a more gradual climb and a gentler descent. Note that Facebook was conceived in 2003 – the lowest point for Internet investing post-bust – and that in 2004, Google’s IPO kicked off the renaissance that persists today.

So is the cleantech pullback justified? The data says it’s too early to call. However, it also suggests that the time frame required to reach a conclusion will greatly stretch 10-year closed-ended funds.

(A diligent reader may point out my own numbers showing that when VC-backed cleantech start-ups have gone public, they’ve mostly done so in less than 10 years. My take is that most of these companies were rushed to public markets before they were ready – explaining the awful aftermarket performance.)

What happens now?

Cleantech innovation is about to take a walk in the woods. Justified or not, the established path of VC-backed investment is narrowing for a generation of start-ups. Some of those companies – and some of the investment managers that have backed them – will break off into the wilderness to find a new route.

In this environment, I see opportunities in:

• Selective recaps. About 270 cleantech start-ups can be characterized as “late stage” (they’ve raised Series C rounds or later). Of those, about 150 have demonstrated proof of economics and are focused on scale-up. If capital keeps receding, there won’t be nearly enough money to fund them to exit – enabling savvy late-stage financiers to pick off the best of the bunch in recaps that reap disproportionate returns. In 2011 I thought this capital gap wouldn’t persist, because the likes of VantagePoint and Silver Lake Kraftwerk were out raising huge funds aimed at it; the failure and scale-back of those efforts leaves the opportunity open.
• Cross-border plays. The U.S. dominates cleantech innovation, but China and other overseas nations dominate deployment. New vehicles are mobilizing to provide cleantech equity investment coupled with cross-border JV creation and operational help – including Formation8 and a stealth-mode firm I can’t reveal.
• Strategic investment, rethought. Large corporations in industrials and energy have strategic motivations to foster cleantech start-ups: The likes of GE and General Motors want an innovation pipeline, while utilities want a stream of new equipment to rate-base. Institutions are forming to organize this activity in a merchant banking model, like Broadscale at the late stage and OnRamp Capital at the early.
• Foreign techno-colonialism. While U.S. investors bemoan a lack of capital for cleantech, many foreign institutions are awash in it – and view American assets as being generally cheap. To U.S. start-ups, they will play a role somewhere on a continuum between savior (e.g. Japanese trading houses bankrolling cleantech start-ups to get the inside track on project financing) and reaper (e.g. Wanxiang’s A123Systems deal).
• Philanthropic capital. The cleantech projects that would most change the world – think electrofuels, solar antennae, advanced nuclear power – are also the least likely to be funded, because they combine long time frames with extraordinary risk. There is a case to be made for impact investment in these fields using philanthropic capital as a charitable activity. A new effort called PRIME, backed by four visionary family foundations, is leading this charge.

It’s hard out there for cleantech. The woods are scary and the journey is uncertain. But pioneers are charting a new path through the thicket – blazing trails that others will follow.

Matthew Nordan (@matthewnordan) is an energy VC investor at Venrock, one of the oldest and best-performing VC firms. Earlier, he co-founded and led the energy tech analyst firm Lux Research and forecasted technology futures at Forrester. There’s more where this came from at mnordan.com.

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If Fisker is able to close on either of these deals, it could move its business to China and gain the funds to start manufacturing its second car the Atlantic, as well as start paying back its loan to the Department of Energy. Fisker has been looking for suitors — partners and acquirers — for months, as it wrapped up a year with an incredible amount of problems.

But $350 million for 85 percent stake is a major discount on the original valuation of Fisker. The company has raised a billion dollars in funding, and at one point back in 2011 had raised money at a reported valuation of $2.2 billion. But in 2012, the company struggled heavily and I had heard that it was looking to raise money last year at a significantly lower valuation. Clearly, when discussions are for majority stake deals for between $200 million and $300 million, there’s been massive discounting.

Fisker isn’t the only energy tech company that’s looking to sell for a discount to Chinese conglomerates. Lithium ion battery maker — which sold batteries for Fisker’s electric car — went bankrupt and its assets are being sold off to Chinese auto tech giant Wanxiang for $256.6 million. A123 Systems held the largest IPO in 2009, raising some $371 million, and went public at $20 per share. A123 also raised more than $350 million from private investors when it was still a startup.

Wanxiang has also invested in struggling electric car company Smith Electric Vehicles. Battery maker Boston Power also turned to Chinese investors to take its electric car battery business to the next level, as did Protean Electric. Electric car company Coda Automotive — which is also struggling — has a joint venture with China battery maker Lishen and a deal with auto maker Great Wall Motors Company.

Chinese companies and the Chinese government are very interested in amassing next-gen technology for electric cars. China is projected to be the largest electric car maker and market in the world, and is already the world’s largest auto market.

It’s not just electric car assets that Chinese companies want. Wanxiang invested $420 million into GreatPoint Energy, a company based in Cambridge, Mass. that converts coal into cleaner-burning natural gas. And Chinese power company Hanergy acquired the assets of Miasole for $30 million (Miasole had raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors).

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This rate of production has been Tesla’s goal for months — if not years — and it’s a big step on the company’s path to profitability this year. Back in November, during its latest quarterly earnings, Tesla said it was on track to reach this milestone after having to scale back its original production goals a couple months earlier in September. It also means that all those customers on the waiting list to get their Model S cars — there were 13,200 as of the third quarter — will get their cars sooner, rather than later.

However, as I’ve written before, Tesla seems to be the exception rather than the rule in the struggling world of independent electric car makers and batteries made for electric cars. Electric car infrastructure maker Better Place shuffled out its second CEO in as many months last week, and laid off a big chunk of staff in the face of very slow adoption of its electric car service in Israel.

Electric car startup Fisker hasn’t made any of its hybrid electric Karma cars in months, and is looking for a Chinese partner, investor or acquirer with deep pockets to offer it a lifeline. Fisker’s original production goal at the beginning of its life was 5,000 Karmas in 2011, and it’s made around 1,900. A123 Systems, which has been making batteries for Fisker’s Karma, went bankrupt last year and then was bought by Chinese auto tech giant Wanxiang.

For the auto giants like GM and Nissan, which have been making their own mainstream electric cars, production isn’t a problem. It’s just that sales are a little slow. GM sold a total of 23,461 Volts in 2012, up from the 7,671 sold in 2011, and Nissan sold 9,819 Leafs in 2012, according to AutoblogGreen. GM originally wanted to sell 45,000 Volts in 2012.

So why is it so hard for independent electric car companies to meet their targets, and large auto makers to hit sales targets? For the auto giants, the market is only just emerging. GM’s Volt and the Nissan LEAF are the first mass produced plug-in battery cars on the market in the U.S. Auto exec Bob Lutz, who kickstarted GM’s Volt and is now on the board of some startups, says the transition to electric cars will be very slow.

For independent car startups, commercial scale production can be daunting and take a lot longer than expected, too. Many things can go wrong, and the it can take months to streamline the process of auto manufacturing. Tesla was founded back in 2003, and its pilot car — where it made errors and suffered delays — was the original Roadster. It’s taken Tesla this many years to get to its closer to mainstream auto maker status just pushing out 400 cars per week.

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Leyden Energy was founded in 2007 (formerly called Mobius Power) with a patent acquired from chemical giant Dupont, and a $4.5 million investment from investors. Leyden’s original secret sauce is an innovation for the electrolyte part of the battery. A battery has a positive and a negative plate and then an electrolyte in between, which is the substance through which electrons transfer back and forth while the battery charges and discharges.

In addition to its electrolyte innovation, Leyden also has a new breakthrough technology for a silicon anode that boosts the energy density (amount of energy stored per volume) and enables the battery to be made in a very slim form factor. Many battery companies combine next-generation technology in each part of the battery to produce a better whole battery in production.

Making lithium ion batteries slim is a priority for Leyden. It’s recently been focused on tablets and consumer electronics and announced an effort with chipmaker NVIDIA to design tablets; it also has been courting makers of chargers for smart phones and devices for personal Wi-Fi hot spots. A couple years ago Leyden launched a replacement lithium-ion battery for laptops that won’t degrade (start losing its full charge) for at least three years, and will come with a three-year warranty.

Start-stop vehicle tech, which uses a battery to automatically cut off the engine of a gas-powered vehicle while it’s idling, is another target area for Leyden. Start-stop vehicle technology is starting to gain momentum in Europe, following carbon reduction regulations, and the technology can reduce fuel use by 5 to 12 percent.

These are difficult times for battery startups right now, particularly those that were hoping the electric car market would take off faster than it has. Lithium ion battery leader A123 Systems recently went bankrupt and then was sold to Chinese auto parts giant Wanxiang. Battery maker Ener1 also filed for bankruptcy last year.

But there’s still some rare next-gen battery startups looking to innovate around new materials, new production techniques, and nanotechnology. Here’s 13 battery startups to watch in 2013.

Leyden’s series C round of $10 million came from existing investors including NEA, Lightspeed Ventures, Sigma Partners and Walden International. The company has raised $48 million in venture capital since it was founded.

Images courtesy of Leyden Energy.

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The winning bid beat out Johnson Control’s bid to acquire A123′s automotive division. Johnson Controls previously had offered to buy the automotive division and two factories for $125 million.

One of the reasons Wanxiang’s offer to buy up A123 had been controversial was because A123 had some U.S. military contracts, which critics didn’t want to see in the hands of a Chinese company. But A123 decided to sell off its government business, including all its U.S. military contracts, to Illinois-based company Navitas Systems, for $2.25 million. Wanxiang acquired the rest of the assets including the grid storage business.

We’ll see if that move silences politician critics like U.S. Sens. John Thune (R-S.D.) and Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa). The deal still has to be approved by the bankruptcy court as well as the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFIUS).

If approved, the future of A123 System’s lithium ion battery tech will fittingly be owned by a Chinese auto giant, as China is increasingly becoming one of the most important markets for electric vehicles. Money from Chinese investors, conglomerates, cities and the government, continues to drive a significant amount of the future of next-generation electric car technology.

The deal also provides a future for A123′s technology, which had a promising beginning, but had suffered a series of setbacks in 2012. Venture-backed A123 held the largest IPO in 2009, raising some $371 million, and was trading at over $20 per share when it started trading. A123 also raised more than $350 million from private investors when it was still a startup.

Yet in recent months, it suffered from manufacturing problems, and also had only a handful of customers for its premium batteries. The company had been losing boat loads of money for years.

The Wanxiang deal still won’t make back enough to cover its debts. A123 says:

Because the total purchase price for A123’s assets would be less than the total amount owed to creditors, the Company does not anticipate any recoveries for its current shareholders and believes its stock to have no value.

Now that the A123 bankruptcy is moving forward, it will be interesting to see what Fisker Automotive, one of A123′s prime customers, will do. Fisker had told the media that it is waiting for the results of the A123 auction before it starts back up assembling its Karma cars.

This isn’t Wanxiang’s first cleantech and clean energy acquisition — it’s actually its fifth in 2012, says the company in a release. Wanxiang has been aggressively acquiring under valued American cleantech and clean energy companies.

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If you haven’t been following this story, Wanxiang originally had a deal to buy up to 80 percent of A123 Systems for $450 million if A123 met certain conditions. Either those conditions weren’t met — or A123 grew worried that its deal with a Chinese conglomerate might face hurdles — because a few months later that deal fell through and A123 declared bankruptcy. The auction today will determine what happens to A123 post-bankruptcy.

Here’s why the prospect of A123 being sold to a Chinese firm has been raising eyebrows:

A123, once a promising battery maker that held one of the largest cleantech IPOs back in 2009, was awarded a grant from the Department of Energy for $249 million, and A123 drew down on $132 million of that grant. So the U.S. government put substantial money into developing this technology. In addition, A123 has had contracts with the U.S. military.

Both of these aspects have made a sale of A123 to Wanxiang distasteful to some politicians, like U.S. Sens. John Thune (R-S.D.) and Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa). They’ve written letters on the subject and asked for a sale to Wanxiang be blocked. To add kindling to the fire, electric vehicles — and cleantech in general — have become a politicized issue, with high profile Republican politicians rejecting the support of electric vehicles, and Democratic ones embracing support for the technology.

Meanwhile, electric car startup Fisker Automotive, which has also been the subject of much politically driven criticism, has been a  major customer of A123′s batteries. So it is waiting on the result of the bankruptcy case before it figures out what to with the assembly of its cars. By the way, Fisker deserves a lot of criticism, but not for building its first car in Finland, which is what politicians have been upset about.

Fears of Chinese tech companies swooping in and buying up beleagured U.S. assets is at the heart of this issue. The discussions of the military contracts, and the misplaced grants from the DOE are side notes, which can be addressed independently. The reality is that China using the U.S. as a discount shopping mall is only going to continue to grow. Wanxiang has been — smartly or not — shopping for low valued energy, cleantech and electric car assets in the U.S. That’s how global capitalism works and in recent years has increasingly been working in the U.S. and China.

A123 should be allowed to find the best deal for its assets and shareholders regardless of the country. The potential acquirer that values the technology the highest, and is willing to pay the most, should win the bidding.

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Johnson Controls will also provide A123 Systems with $72.5 million to continue its operations at these factories, which will continue to produce batteries. The Department of Energy is already on top of the story, and sent me points stating that “A123 has only used $132 million of its 2009 grant (in addition to the $6 million from the Bush Administration.)” The bankruptcy will be sure to be controversial, and perhaps we’ll even hear about it in the second round of presidential debates tonight.

I’m not exactly sure what the status of A123 System’s deal with Wanxiang is at this point. The Chinese conglomerate announced a deal in August that said it planned to invest up to $450 million in A123, for an 80 percent ownership of the firm, if certain conditions were met. I’ve emailed Wanxiang to see if that deal has been abandoned. Seems like the deal would be off if Johnson Controls is buying up much of the assets.

Bloomberg notes that A123 has listed assets of $459.8 million and debt of $376 million as of Aug. 31 in its Chapter 11 documents filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court. A123′s stock plummeted this morning by 73.50 percent to 6 cents. A123 went public in 2009, with its shares opening at $17 per share and closing at $20.29 per share on the first day of trading.

A123 has been bleeding cash for months. One of the problems was that in March A123 announced that it would start replacing battery packs with defective cells made at its Livonia, Mich., factory. That mistake cost the company $51.6 million in warranty costs during the first quarter and another estimated $15.2 million for replacing defective batteries that were in its inventory. A123 had to replace these defective batteries in its electric car maker customer Fisker Automotive’s inaugural cars.

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